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In July 2011, Pope Benedict XVI publicly condemned the ordination of Father Paul Lei Shiyin as Bishop, an appointment the Vatican had 
not previously approved. The conflict between Beijing 
and the Holy See over the appointment of Chinese 
bishops dates back to 1951, when China and Vatican 
broke diplomatic relations. This paper questions why 
the Vatican and the People’s Republic of China failed 
to establish normal relations between 1949 and 1989.
The literature on the diplomatic relations 
between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Holy See is sparse. Beatrice Leung’s monograph Sino-
Vatican Relations: Problems in Conflicting Authority 
1976-1986 is the most authoritative account of Sino-
Vatican relations after 1949. Leung analyzes the major 
developments of Beijing-Vatican relations in terms of 
a clash of authority between the Pope and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).1
Gerald Chan, a professor of International 
Relations at the University of Auckland, follows the 
same line of argument, pinpointing two specific issues 
of conflicting authorities: the Taiwan question and the 
problem of appointment of Chinese bishops.2 Eric O. 
Hanson, a leading expert on Vatican diplomacy in 
Asia, among other authors, agrees with this position. 
However, he observes a gradual PRC-Vatican 
rapprochement in the 1980s.3 Likewise, Chinese 
academics focus on the conflicts of authority between 
China and the Vatican, often with a marked Sino-
centric perspective.4 Although both Western and 
Chinese scholars have unearthed a wealth of factual 
information, their works devoted little attention to the 
Cold War context that the PRC grappled with after 
1949.
 Contrastingly, there is a wealth of literature on 
the history of both the Chinese Catholic Church and 
the missionary orders in China. Kim-Kwon Chan 
has written extensively on the peculiar theological 
situation of the Chinese Catholic Church. Jean Paul 
Wiest provided a detailed account of the Maryknoll 
Society’s activity in China during the first years of the 
PRC in Maryknoll in China.5 The late Lazlo Ladany, a 
Hungarian-born Jesuit and Sinologist based in Hong 
Kong, wrote an especially scathing account of the 
Communist Party’s harsh treatment of the Chinese 
Catholic Church.6 However, most authors writing on 
the Chinese Catholic Church tend to create a narrative 
of martyrdom.  This position distracts from serious 
reflections on issues pertaining to the links between 
Sino-Vatican relations, Chinese religious policies, and 
the beginning and end of the Cold War for the PRC. 
This paper will employ a different approach. 
Rather than focusing on bilateral problems between 
China and the Holy See, I will attempt to situate 
Sino-Vatican relations within the major shifts of 
PRC ideology and strategy during the Cold War and 
the post-Cold War eras. This paper will argue that, 
although China’s exit from the Cold War expanded its 
strategy from unambiguous confrontation to gradual 
rapprochement towards the Vatican between 1949 
and 1989, Beijing deliberately blocked any possibility 
of normalized relations.  During China’s Cold War era 
(1949-1976), Mao’s ideological considerations largely 
influenced the dynamics of Sino-Vatican relations and 
restricted the PRC to a position of uncompromising 
hostility toward the Holy See. However, with Mao 
Zedong’s death in 1976, the normalization of Sino-
American relations and 1979 and the trial of the Gang 
of Four in 1981, China was no longer trapped in the 
ideological conflicts of the Cold War. With the end of 
the Chinese involvement in the Cold War, the PRC 
adopted a variety of courses of action throughout 
the 1980s, alternating between friendly and hostile 
policies toward the Vatican to pursue its strategic 
goals of modernizing the economy and safeguarding 
its sovereignty. 
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This essay is centered on an analysis of both 
English and Chinese primary sources pertaining 
to PRC-Holy See relations. The English-language 
primary sources include newspapers from Western 
media as well as published Vatican official documents. 
The Chinese-language primary sources comprise 
newspapers from the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), a 
major Party mouthpiece, as well as recently published 
collections of Party documents.i This analysis is 
complemented by valuable factual information drawn 
from secondary literature. Important milestones from 
China’s Cold War history, such as the Korean War, the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, will 
serve as the primary guides for analysis of primary and 
secondary sources. However, an exclusive focus on the 
Chinese Communist Party’s decisions is insufficient 
in achieving a full understanding of the major 
developments in Sino-Vatican relations between 1949 
and 1989. Such understanding will require crucial, 
contextual information regarding the Vatican’s policies 
toward communist states in general and the history of 
the Chinese Catholic Church. Finally, the analysis of 
this paper relies heavily on public pronouncements 
of the Vatican, the CCP and the Chinese Catholic 
Church.  Therefore, special attention is given to the 
language in these pronouncements. Following the 
tradition of “kremlinology,” I perform a close reading 
of official pronouncements with the assumption that 
specific formulations, or the lack of thereof, reveal 
crucial information about the implicit intentions of 
both Chinese and Vatican policy-makers. 
A preliminary clarification of terminology is in 
order. First, this paper does not define “ideology” as 
fabricated rhetoric that historical agents can espouse 
or discard at will to further and hide their “true” 
intentions. Recent Cold War scholarship by Chen 
Jian and Lorenz Lüthi have amply demonstrated that 
ideology played a crucial role in shaping the decisions 
of the Chinese leaders during the Maoist era. That 
is why this paper defines “ideology” as a worldview 
that allows historical agents to make sense of their 
world and shapes and constrains their decisions. 
Furthermore, by the terms “Chinese Catholic Church” 
or “Chinese National Church,” this paper designates 
the Chinese Church as a whole. By “Chinese Patriotic 
i This essay cites the Renmin Ribao extensively for two reasons. First, the 
content of Renmin Ribao articles should not be dismissed as mere propaganda: 
as the official newspaper of the CCP, the Renmin Ribao directly revealed 
information about the policies and positions of the Party leadership. Second, 
Renmin Ribao was the only Chinese-language newspaper whose database the 
author could access using the resources of McGill University.
Church” this paper means the portion of the Chinese 
Catholic Church that is subservient to the CCP, and by 
“underground Church,” this paper specifically refers to 
the part of the Chinese Church that resists the CCP by 
proclaiming their loyalty to the Pope. Little is known 
about this resistance underground Church, and any 
discussion on the topic exceeds the scope of this paper. 
Finally, this paper uses the term “Universal Church” 
to identify the worldwide organization of the Catholic 
Church as a whole. This term opposes the term 
“Chinese Catholic Church,” which merely designates 
the National Church in China. It is important not to 
confuse the “Universal Church” with “Vatican” and 
“The Holy See,” since the two latter terms are used to 
refer to the Vatican as a strictly political entity capable 
of entering diplomatic relations with other political 
entities.
VATICAN AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC (1945-
1989)
Under Pope Pius XII (1939-1958), the Vatican’s 
foreign policy was firmly entrenched in an anti-
Communist orientation. As post-war Eastern Europe 
gradually became Sovietized, Pope Pius XII exhorted 
Catholic believers under Communist rule to stick to 
their faith and attacked those who chose collaboration. 
In 1946, Pius XII encouraged imprisoned Ukrainian 
bishops to “proclaim and preach Christ” despite 
“being in bonds.”7 The Pope forcefully asserted that 
“it was absolutely unlawful, even merely exteriorly 
or verbally, to abandon Christ and his Church.”8 
He threatened Catholic collaborators with the 
punishment of excommunication.9 Furthermore, Pius 
XII ordered several secret consecrations of bishops 
as a pre-emptive measure, in case existing bishops in 
Communist countries were put in jail. For example, 
the Pope had the American Bishop Gerald Patrick 
O’Hara secretly consecrate Joseph Schubert as Bishop 
for the Romanian Church in June 1950. Schubert 
was arrested shortly afterwards in February 1951. 
Pius XII’s intransigence placed the Catholic clergy in 
Communist countries in a difficult position causing 
Communists to feel less restrained in carrying out 
their anti-religious campaigns. Due to his anti-Fascist 
credentials, Czech Communists did not dare touch 
Archbishop Joseph Beran for a long time. Suddenly, 
the Archbishop found himself placed under house 
arrest in 1949 and interned in village cloisters for 
fourteen years. Despite the problematic situations 
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of the clergy in Communist countries, the Holy See 
failed to provide concrete assistance to the Churches 
under attack.10
Pope Pius XII died on October 9, 1958. His 
successor, John XXIII (1958-1963), took drastic steps 
in improving the Vatican’s relations with Communist 
countries. In initiating the Second Vatican Council 
(1962-1965), the Pope laid the groundwork for an 
eventual détente with the Communist powers, which 
brought substantial doctrinal revisions aimed at 
modernizing the Church. As tensions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union escalated during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, John XXIII promoted 
peace and offered to mediate the conflict.11 The Pope 
engaged Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev directly. 
In March 7, 1963, the Pope received Khrushchev’s 
daughter and son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, during a 
papal audience and in private.12 Although the Pope 
evaded Adzhubei’s question of whether the Holy See 
wanted diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, he 
concluded the meeting on a pleasant note by personally 
blessing the couple’s children. John XXIII was able to 
secure the release of the Ukrainian Metropolitan Josef 
Slipyj and several other imprisoned bishops as well by 
directly improving relations with the Soviet Union.13
With the death of John XXIII, Pope Paul VI 
(1963-1978) continued his predecessor’s approach of 
engaging dialogue with Communist powers. Having 
inherited the “spirit of the Vatican II,” Paul VI now 
pursued a consistent policy of Ostpolitik based on the 
following principles: 1) the goal of negotiations was 
not to increase prestige of the Holy See, but rather to 
create conditions that make pastoral life possible, and 
2) partial temporary solutions are always better than 
Concordats by virtue of their flexibility. Ostpolitik 
under Paul VI’s tenure yielded varying degrees 
of success for different countries. In the case of 
Yugoslavia, the Vatican was able to sign a “protocol” 
in 1966, which guaranteed the National Church’s 
jurisdiction over religious and spiritual questions in 
exchange for a de-politicization of the Church itself.14 
Relations with Yugoslavia were later normalized in 
1970. The Hungarian Church fared far worse. Both 
Vatican diplomats and the Hungarian Communist 
leaders were frustrated with Cardinal Mindzenty’s 
stubborn and confrontational attitude. Negotiations 
did not yield an improvement of the pastoral life in 
Hungary.15 Paul VI’s Ostpolitik was not restricted to 
Europe. He also attempted, without much success, 
to set himself up as a peace mediator in the conflict 
between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 
and the United States. Though the Americans reacted 
favorably to his role of mediator, the Vietnamese 
rebuked his appeals.16
After the death of Paul VI in 1978, Vatican 
policy toward Communist States became more 
assertive and confrontational under Pope John Paul 
II (1978-2005). The new Pope publicly condemned 
the “state totalitarianism of this century” as a “threat 
to mankind” in March 1979.17 When John Paul II 
visited his native Poland in June 1979, he exhorted the 
Polish Catholics to “not [be] afraid.” 18 His message 
generated widespread euphoria among the Polish 
population and embarrassed the Communist rulers 
of the country.19 The Pope actively lent his support 
to Lech Wałesa’s Solidarity Labor organization, which 
emerged from the 1980 strikes of the Gdansk shipyard. 
Nonetheless, John Paul II did not completely return to 
the confrontational policies of Pius XII. That he named 
Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the architect of Paul VI’s 
Ostpolitik, his Secretary of State in 1979 indicated that 
he did not wish to rule out negotiation.20 Although 
John Paul II was committed to his predecessor’s 
Ostpolitik, he also encouraged resistance within the 
Eastern European Catholic Churches by adopting 
new, morally assertive rhetoric.  John Paul II’s policies 
of resistance encouragement would not have been 
possible without the negotiated settlements under 
Paul VI that ensured the Catholic Church’s survival in 
Eastern European communist countries.
ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH
The history of Sino-Vatican relations was full of 
complex interactions. China’s first significant contacts 
with Catholic missionaries occurred in the sixteenth 
century, just as the Spanish and Portuguese sailed 
the seas and expanded their colonial empires. Jesuit 
Missionary Matteo Ricci, having been granted an 
audience with the Ming Emperor Wanli, traveled to 
Beijing in 1601. Ricci, like most Jesuit missionaries of 
his time, wanted to spread the Gospel in China through 
the conversion of ruling elites. Ricci soon established 
himself in a favorable position within the Beijing 
imperial court. His knowledge of the modern sciences 
and technologies and his successful conversion of 
powerful mandarins such as Xu Guangqi was valuable 
to the dynasty. Ricci studied the Confucian classics 
extensively, advocating that Christian teachings were 
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compatible and complementary to Confucius’s ideas.21
Even when the Qing dynasty took over China 
in 1644, the Jesuit missionaries did not lose their 
influence among the ruling classes. Jesuit Adam 
Schall von Bell became director of the Astronomical 
Bureau at the imperial court of Emperor Shunzhi. 
Under the Emperor Kangxi, this post was given to 
Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest. However, the good fortunes 
of the Jesuits and the Catholic Church would soon 
come to an end with the controversy surrounding the 
Confucian Rites.22 
 When Charles Maigrot, the Vicar Apostolic in 
Fujian, issued a decree forbidding Chinese Christians 
to practice the Confucian rites of ancestral worships in 
March 1693, Emperor Kangxi called for missionaries 
to adhere to Ricci’s policies of accommodation. 
The Jesuits advocated for conciliation, while the 
Dominicans, Franciscans, and other missionaries 
took a hardline against the Confucian rites. Pope 
Clement XI issued a Papal bull in 1715 ruling in favor 
of the Dominicans and Franciscans.  Emperor Kangxi 
retaliated in 1721 by banning Christianity in China. 
Churches were closed under Emperor Yongzhong, 
and many Christians were arrested under Emperor 
Qianlong. The persecution that resulted from the 
Confucian Rites controversy curtailed much of the 
presence of foreign missionaries, thus severing the 
ties between Rome and the Chinese Catholic Church. 
This separation was further aggravated when Pope 
Clement XIV suppressed the Jesuits in 1773.23 
 The persecutions severely crippled the 
ecclesiastical leadership of the Chinese Catholic 
Church. The lay communities took active measures to 
ensure the survival of their faith. Catholic communities 
became tightly organized around clans, with clan 
leaders managing the affairs of the local churches.24 
Women known as “Virgins” dedicated their lives to the 
service of the Chinese Church by caring for chapels, 
leading prayers at mass, and charging themselves 
with the religious instruction of Catholic children.25 
The Chinese Catholics preserved a regular rhythm of 
pastoral life through the creation of a lay leadership. 
 With the Qing defeat at the hands of Western 
imperialist powers during the Opium Wars and the 
signature of “unequal treaties” by the mid-19th century 
missionary work resumed in China. The new Catholic 
missionaries, having made their way into China by 
riding the tidal wave of Western imperialism, clashed 
with the indigenous lay leadership of the Catholic 
communities. They quickly imposed their own 
authority. Wresting the leadership from the hands 
of Catholic clan leaders and “Virgins,” the Chinese 
Catholic Church once more became a foreign church 
as the new missionaries established themselves as 
its leaders. Nonetheless, the presence of foreign 
missionaries guaranteed the safety and growth of the 
Chinese Church. 
With the increasingly visible presence of the 
foreign missionaries, Christianity acquired the stigma 
of imperialist encroachment in the eyes of the Chinese 
population. The Confucian literati-gentry viewed the 
Christian doctrine as a threat against their traditions. 
The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 targeted both foreign 
and Chinese Christians, and the superstitious rebels 
equated Christianity with evil. The overall negative 
picture of Christianity would remain in the hearts 
and minds of the Chinese long after the departure of 
Western imperialists.
During the first half of the twentieth century, 
the Vatican pushed for indigenization of the clergy 
of the Chinese Catholic Church. Pope Benedict XV 
(1914-1922) and Pope Pius XI (1922-1939), in 1919 
and 1926, respectively, called for foreign missionaries 
to cede their posts to Chinese priests.  Their efforts 
yielded few results; the foreign missionaries seemed 
reluctant to relinquish their positions of leadership. 
The normalization of Sino-Vatican relations in 1939 
did not improve the situation. Only in 1946 did the 
Chinese Catholic Church officially become a national 
church; even by then, foreigners still dominated its 
ecclesiastic leadership. 26
RELIGION AND THE UNITED FRONT
Anti-imperialist ideology guided the CCP’s 
United Front tactics during the first decade of PRC 
history. In September 1949, as the Communist takeover 
of the country neared its completion, the People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (PCC) adopted a 
statement containing a set of guidelines for the future 
of the PRC called the Common Program. Article 13 of 
the Common Program stipulated that the PCC was to 
be organized along the lines of a “Popular Democratic 
United Front.” This included representatives from the 
working class, the intellectuals, the ethnic minorities, 
and other “patriotic elements.”27 Article 7 called for 
the suppression of “counterrevolutionary imperialist 
activities” in China.28 The purpose of the CCP’s United 
Front tactics was, in the words of United Front Work 
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Department Director Li Weihan, the simultaneous 
“creation of alliances and carrying out of struggles.”29 
It was necessary to ally with “patriotic elements” 
from all social strata in order to “isolate the lingering 
imperialist influences.”30 The CCP’s United Front 
tactics harkened back to Mao’s “mass line.” The Party 
had to ally itself with the patriotic masses in order to 
purge the country of imperialist influence.
The nature of the United Front Work Department 
activities was contingent upon the major ideological 
developments in China. Both Li Weihan and 
Premier Zhou Enlai identified two dominant types of 
relationships that were important to the CCP’s United 
Front tactics: the relationship between classes and the 
one between Party and non-Party elements, which 
included religious groups, minority parties, and ethnic 
minorities.31 United Front tactics amounted to a dual 
policy of “alliances and struggles” toward both the 
non-proletarian classes and the non-Party elements. 
Major ideological upheavals, such as the Resist-
America-Aid-Korea Campaign of 1950-1951, the 
Hungarian Crisis in 1956, the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
in 1957, and the Great Leap Forward of 1958 exerted 
considerable strain on United Front activities. During 
those events, intellectuals and religious leaders critical 
to the Party were purged under the guise of anti-
imperialist struggle. Pro-CC non-Party elements were 
exalted for their “patriotism.” In 1960, at the end of 
the Great Leap Forward, Li Weihan urged non-Party 
elements to “stick very close to the CCP as socialist 
transformations reached a new height.”32
Despite the ideological strains, class relationships 
and party-to-non-party dealings still formed two 
separate dimensions of United Front policies up to 
the mid-1960s. Anti-imperialism did not specifically 
entail struggle against non-proletarian and peasant 
classes. Cooperation with the CCP was the sole 
criterion for “patriotism.” However, when class struggle 
displaced the mass line as the central component of 
Mao’s ideological discourse, the United Front Work 
Department was shut down altogether. The Party’s 
dealings with non-Party elements no longer appeared 
necessary now that class struggle propelled to the 
ideological foreground.33
The United Front Work Department was reopened 
in 1975, yet it would only acquire a new orientation 
in the post-Mao era. Under Deng Xiaoping, class 
struggle gradually phased out from official rhetoric, 
with “economic modernization” replacing it as the 
watchword of the day. Party to non-Party relations 
was now the only remaining dimension of the United 
Front policies.34 The scope of the Party’s United Front 
work would expand considerably internationally as 
the Chinese leadership sought the cooperation of the 
Guomindang for a peaceful reunification with Taiwan.
The religious polices of the CCP were closely 
connected to United Front work, that is, to the 
management of Party to non-Party relations. The 
“alliance and struggle” tactic was a recurring theme 
in the relations between the CCP and the Chinese 
Catholic Church.35 The concrete application of this 
tactic changed in accordance with the fluctuations of 
Mao’s ideology, which in turn impacted the dynamics 
of the CCP’s relations with both the Vatican and the 
Chinese Catholic Church. Therefore, Sino-Vatican 
relations should be analyzed in terms of relations 
between states and interactions between the Party and 
non-Party elements.
1949-1952: IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION
Between 1949 and 1952, the Chinese Communist 
Party’s policies toward Vatican and the Chinese 
Catholic Church showed an ideological commitment 
to the principle of anti-imperialism. Since foreigners 
dominated the ecclesiastical leadership of the Chinese 
National Church, the CCP perceived it was waging an 
actual battle against imperialist encroachments within 
the country. This perception heightened as the Korean 
War broke out, and the resulting tension fueled the 
domestic mobilization of both the Party and the 
Chinese Catholics against the foreign leadership of 
the Chinese Church.  Consequently, the Korean War 
limited the strategic options of China toward Vatican 
to unequivocal confrontation. 
As the Chinese Communist Party consolidated 
its foothold in mainland China, it deployed its United 
Front tactics against all religious groups within the 
country, including the Chinese Catholic Church. 
The CCP supported potential pro-Communist 
sympathizers and collaborators within the Chinese 
Catholic Church to attack its foreign, “imperialist” 
leadership. In May 1950, during a series of four 
meetings with Chinese Protestant leaders, Premier 
Zhou Enlai called for all religious groups to maintain 
their “anti-imperialist resolve” and to “cut off their ties 
with American imperialism.”36 Upon concluding these 
meetings, Zhou, together with Protestant leaders, 
produced a Manifesto that called for all religious 
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groups to cleanse themselves of “imperialist influence 
by adhering to following principles of autonomy: “self-
governance”, “self-financing” and “self-propagation.” 
The Manifesto outlined the core principles of what 
would be later known as the “Three-Self Movement.”37
On August 19, 1950, the Central Committee of 
the CCP issued a document that identified Chinese 
Catholic and Protestant Churches as potential loci of 
imperialist spying operations. The document explicitly 
endorsed the Three-Self Movement, citing the 
necessity to rally “patriotic” elements among Chinese 
Catholics and emphasized the need to implement 
“appropriate programs of political education” within 
education establishments under the Chinese Catholic 
Church’s control.38 Beijing simultaneously launched 
sporadic propaganda attacks against the Vatican. 
Various newspaper articles that appeared in the 
Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) referred to “Vatican-
headed Catholic Church reactionary groups” as agents 
of the U.S.-lead imperialist camp.39 However, the anti-
imperialist rhetoric in the CCP’s articulation of its 
religious policies did not seem to elicit any immediate 
response from the Chinese Catholic Church.
Archbishop Antonio Riberi, the Vatican’s 
nuncioii to China, showed no willingness to placate 
the sensibilities of the CCP. Closely adhering to Pope 
Pius XII’s anti-Communist stance, Riberi encouraged 
resistance within the Chinese Catholic Church. 
Appointed nuncio to China in 1946, Riberi decided 
to stay in Nanjing in 1949 and defiantly presented 
his credentials to the newly established Communist 
government. Prior to the CCP victory in 1949, Riberi 
already began to sponsor the growth of the Legion of 
Mary in China, an international Catholic organization 
engaged in spiritual work centered on devotion to the 
Holy Virgin founded in Ireland in the 1920’s.40 The 
organization had a quasi-military structure. It was 
divided in small groups, each active in recruiting 
young Catholic women in parishes and high schools 
and universities. The Legion held weekly sessions of 
catechism study, during which they prayed, studied 
theology, and engaged in doctrinal refutation of 
Marxist theory.41 Though the organization purported 
to be apolitical, Riberi no doubt saw its potential as 
a grassroots resistance movement against the CCP. 
ii An Apostolic nuncio, or papal nuncio, is a diplomatic representative of the 
Holy See that is equivalent to the rank of an ambassador or plenipotentiary. 
The nuncio is appointed by the Holy See and acts as its envoy or permanent 
representative to a state or international organization. The nuncio is the head 
of the Apostolic Nunciature, a diplomatic mission of the Holy See equivalent 
to an embassy.
The Party was deeply wary of the Legion of Mary, 
especially as it became involved in the subsequent 
Shanghai resistance movement organized around 
Bishop Ignatius Gong Pinmei. Riberi’s patronage of the 
Legion would eventually provide ammunition for the 
CCP’s subsequent denunciations of his “imperialist” 
activities. 
The advent of the Korean War drastically changed 
PRC-Holy See relations, as well as the relations between 
the CCP and the Chinese Catholic Church. The Xinhua 
News Agency, in a Renmin Ribao article of November 
12, 1950, accused the Vatican and the United States 
of employing “Catholic reactionary groups” for joint 
espionage in China and Korea.42 In the face of the 
intensifying political pressure from the CCP, certain 
Catholics priests and lay leaders of the Guangyuan 
County in Sichuan province issued a Manifesto 
toward the end of November 1950, proclaiming that 
the Catholic Church of Guangyuan would embark on 
a “Movement of Autonomy and Self-Renewal.” The 
Guangyuan Manifesto, while “resolutely stating that 
the Guangyuan Catholic Church would sever its ties 
with U.S.-Imperialists,” also exhorted Catholics to 
adhere to the “Three-Self Movement” and to “Resist 
America, aid Korea through concrete actions.”iii The 
Guangyuan Manifesto was the first public declaration 
in which leaders from the Catholic clergy and laity 
adopted the CCP’s anti-U.S. imperialism rhetoric. 
Nonetheless, for all their staunch defense of their 
“patriotic” credentials, the authors of the Manifesto 
did not explicitly voice their support of the Party, nor 
did they openly and unambiguously associate the 
Vatican with U.S. imperialism.43 
In 1951, the intervention of the Chinese People’s 
Volunteer Army drove the armed conflict on the 
Korean Peninsula to a military stalemate. The Chinese 
Catholic Church felt the intensifying pressures of the 
CCP’s efforts of domestic ideological mobilization. 
On January 23, 1951, a group of patriotic priests from 
the diocese of Nanchong in Sichuan Province issued a 
Manifesto that, for the first time, publically called for 
the “severance of economic and communicative ties 
with the Vatican.”44 According to official press reports, 
Catholic and Protestant believers actively participated 
in the demonstrations of the “Resist America, Aid 
Korea” campaign, “enthusiastically shouting patriotic 
iii The motives of the collaborators is difficult to assess: some probably 
sought to curry favor with the CCP to rise to a prominent positions within the 
Church, while others only cooperated out of fear. Some priests possibly even 
supported the anti-imperialist initiatives of the CCP.
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slogans while marching under the same banner.”45 
The Sichuan Catholics were not the only 
“patriotic” collaborators that rallied to the Communist 
United Front. On March 31, the Nanjing Vicar General 
Li Weiguang issued a public statement proclaiming 
the Nanjing Catholic community’s “severance of 
its political and economic ties with the Curia” and 
adherence to the “Three-Self Movement.”46 The 
statement accused American imperialists of “using the 
[Catholic] Church to conduct activities detrimental to 
the people” and promised that Catholics will “show no 
less patriotic enthusiasm in participating in the Resist 
America Aid Korea enterprise.”47 Shortly after the 
publication of this manifesto, Riberi denounced it in 
a pastoral letter and urged bishops to remain loyal to 
Rome.48
As the CCP rallied “patriotic” Chinese Catholic 
leaders to its United Front, it also moved against 
foreign missionaries within the Chinese Church. 
A document of the Central Committee, issued 
on March 5, recommended the active isolation of 
“foreign reactionary elements” within the Chinese 
Catholic Church to separate them from the “patriotic 
masses.”49 The CCP resorted, among other tactics, 
to the staging of public accusations. “Patriotic” 
Catholic leaders would often publicly accuse foreign 
missionaries of maintaining espionage networks for 
American imperialists. Between March 24 and March 
26, during an accusation meeting organized at the 
Catholic Huayang high school in Kaifeng, Li Maode, 
a sainarian, denounced Bishop Gaetano Pollio and 
Reverend Amelio Crotti for allegedly spreading 
“counterrevolutionary teachings” in order to sabotage 
the Three-Self Movement.50 In a Renmin Ribao article, 
“Patriotic” Catholic priests from the Tianjin diocese 
leveled charges of embezzlement against Bishop 
Jean de Vienne de Hautefeuille (also known as Wen 
Guibin). The same priests also accused Vienne of 
heading an imperialist spy ring consisting of a “band 
of Dutch priests” and requested the prompt expulsion 
of bishop Vienne from China.51 
As public denunciations revolving around 
alleged charges of espionage multiplied, the CCP 
began arresting foreign missionaries. According to 
a Renmin Ribao article published on April 6, the 
Tianjin police arrested Alfred Bonningue and several 
other Jesuits for supposedly “aiding the Americans 
in sabotaging the Chinese People’s liberation 
enterprise.”52 The arrests of foreign missionaries were 
conducted in a highly publicized fashion. The official 
press provided colorful and detailed presentations 
of “irrefutable evidence” that purported to confirm 
the guilt of foreign missionaries. On August 18, a 
Renmin Ribao article discussed at length the arrest 
of several “imperialist spies,” including Italian pilot 
Antonio Riva and bishop Tarcisio Martina, a regional 
apostolic prefect.53 According to the article, Riva, an 
agent of the U.S. government, stockpiled weapons and 
ammunitions to carry out a plot to assassinate the top 
party leadership during the National Day celebrations. 
The article, in addition to presenting photographic 
“evidence” of stockpiled weapons and ammunitions, 
quoted at length written confessions in which Riva 
acknowledged his guilt. Bishop Martina was also 
found guilty of colluding with Riva by aiding the latter 
in stockpiling weapons and ammunitions. Similar 
arrests of “imperialist missionaries” also occurred 
in other dioceses and were reported at length in the 
official press.54 Although the “evidence” presented 
against foreign missionaries was flimsy at best, it still 
reinforced the CCP’s efforts at ideologically mobilizing 
the masses through the depiction of tangible threats 
posed by imperialism. 
The CCP cadres were determined to extract 
written confessions from the incarcerated foreign 
priests, asking the prisoners for only one thing: 
their signature on documents detailing “crimes.” 
The prisoners were often told that they only needed 
to sign said confessions in exchange for their 
freedom.55 The CCP wanted to use the confessions 
in its propaganda campaigns against the “imperialist 
agents of the Catholic Church.”56 Incarcerated priests 
who refused to sign confessions were subjected to 
psychological torture, consisting of verbal abuse 
during interrogations, Marxist discussion groups, and 
harassment by prison guards.57 
Ultimately, most foreign missionaries, after a 
period of incarceration, were expelled from China. A 
few of them, like Bishop James Walsh, would remain 
behind bars until 1970. In 1948, there were 5500 
missionaries in China; however, by 1952, two-thirds 
had been expelled.58 As with the denunciations and 
the arrests, the CCP also conducted the expulsions 
of foreign missionaries with much publicity. For 
example, five months after the expulsion of Bishop 
Jean de Vienne on May 28, 1951, the Renmin Ribao 
published “additional incriminating evidence,” namely 
a written note to Father Alfred Bonningue containing 
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“counterrevolutionary instructions.”59 By increasing 
the publicity of the expulsions of foreign missionaries, 
the CCP sought to heighten the perceived tangibility 
of the internal threats it professed to combat, thus 
reinforcing its campaign of domestic mobilization 
within the context of the Korean War.
The CCP handled the expulsion of nuncio 
Archbishop Riberi in an especially dramatic manner. 
Prior to Riberi’s expulsion, on May 24, 1951, the 
official press accused the Archbishop of encouraging 
“opposition the patriotic movement among the 
Chinese Catholics.”60 Other inflammatory articles 
followed suit, publicly denouncing the activities of 
the Catholic Central Bureau (CCB), an agency under 
the direct control of the Archbishop and calling for 
his expulsion.61 Through such media attacks, the CCP 
sought to convey that the demand to expel Riberi came 
from within the Catholic community. Beijing expelled 
Riberi in early September, fulfilling this “demand.”62 
The expulsion of Riberi was hailed as a major victory 
in the struggle against “imperialist efforts to use the 
Catholic Church to infiltrate China.”63 According to the 
Xinhua News Agency, Riberi was guilty of “partaking 
in the counterrevolutionary activities of Jiang-bandit 
[Chiang Kai-shek], sponsoring the operations of 
American spies such as Antonio Riva and Tarcisio 
Martina” and “creating the counterrevolutionary 
Legion of Mary.”64 
By conjuring a sustained storm of media attacks 
surrounding the expulsion of Riberi, the CCP sought 
to maximize the propaganda effect of the affair, which 
would fuel its Resist-America-Aid-Korea campaign of 
ideological mobilization. The Riberi affair was also the 
culmination of a direct diplomatic conflict between 
China and the Vatican. The CCP took active steps to 
escalate this conflict since the advent of the Korean 
War. The expulsion of the nuncio swept away all hopes 
and illusions for the establishment of normal relations 
between Vatican and the PRC. 
1956-1958: IDEOLOGICAL RADICALIZATION 
AND QUASI-SCHISM
In the wake of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at 
the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, as well as the 
subsequent Hungarian Crisis of October-November 
1956, the CCP began radicalizing its ideology. 
Internationally, Mao felt that the center of world 
revolution was shifting from Moscow to Beijing. 
Domestically, in order to avoid a Hungarian style 
revolt, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign, 
hoping to relieve the oppositional pressure of the CCP. 
However, he only received a bloody nose as criticism 
of the CCP became more widespread. The Hundred 
Flower Campaign was then transformed into the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign; the CCP sought to silence 
its critics and crack down on opposition among the 
intellectuals. It was within this context that the CCP’s 
new campaign of ideological mobilization forced the 
Chinese Catholic Church into a quasi-schismatic 
position.65
As the Anti-Rightist Campaign gained 
momentum in 1957, anti-Vatican invectives, which 
had lessened by 1953, reappeared in the official 
press. Chinese Catholics who did not adhere to the 
“Patriotic” movement were dubbed “[r]ightists who 
sought to promote the reactionary agenda of the 
Vatican.”66 The spotlight of the media attacks fell not 
only on the Vatican, but also on the Chinese Catholics 
who refused to cooperate with the CCP’s design to 
set up a rival Catholic Church with little economic or 
political ties with the Vatican. Newspaper articles often 
featured “outraged Patriotic Catholics” condemning 
the “counterrevolutionary Gong Pinmei group” for 
carrying out “seditious” schemes of the Vatican.67 
Even though Gong and other core leaders of the 
Shanghai Catholic resistance movement were already 
arrested in 1955, they remained perfect targets for the 
CCP’s anti-Vatican propaganda, not able to escape 
subsequent media scrutiny. 
In the middle of the Anti-Rightist campaign, the 
CCP established the Catholic Patriotic Association 
(CPA), an organization that would become the 
instrument through which the CCP consolidated 
its United Front with the Catholic Church by 
implementing policies of control and mobilization. 
The CPA comprised “Patriotic” pro-CCP leaders 
among the Catholic laity and clergy. Its explicit goal 
was to set up an “autonomous self-governed Church” 
that opposed the “undue interference of Vatican in 
China’s internal politics.” 68 In establishing the CPA, 
patriotic Catholics also proclaimed their “unwavering 
resolve to follow the socialist road.”69 However, despite 
all their inflammatory utterances, the “Patriotic 
Catholics” refrained from proclaiming a spiritual 
break with the Vatican. Lin Ziding, the Vicar-General 
of Fujian, was quoted saying that under “acceptable 
circumstances that did not infringe on the interests 
of the Motherland, it was possible to maintain purely 
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religious ties with the Vatican.”70 “Patriotic” Catholics 
also vehemently protested against the charge that they 
were pushing for a schism. Rather, they insisted that 
the Pope erred in excommunicating patriotic priest Li 
Weiguang.71
In 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, 
a series of radical economic policies of socialist 
transformation. Ultimately, these radical changes 
brought intense famines that claimed millions of lives. 
Between 1958 and 1960, as ideological radicalization 
reached new heights, the CCP intensified its United 
Front tactics toward the Chinese Catholic Church. 
On February 5, 1958, the authorities arrested Bishop 
Dominic Deng Yiming, Apostolic administrator of the 
Guangdong (Canton) diocese.72 Deng’s crimes were 
enumerated at length in the official press: accused of 
carrying out the counterrevolutionary instructions of 
the Vatican, sponsoring spying networks throughout 
China, and sabotaging the anti-imperialist patriotic 
movement of the Chinese Catholic Church. In 
March, the Chinese Catholic Church organized 
conferences across China during which patriotic 
leaders publicly endorsed socialism and the Chinese 
Communist Party, while condemning “rightists 
elements within the Church who did the bidding of 
American imperialists.”73 The heightened zeal of the 
“patriotic” leadership, in conjunction with the arrest 
Bishop Deng, a highly respected leader within the 
Catholic clergy, were indications of the ideological 
radicalization underpinning the CCP’s United Front 
tactics toward the Chinese Catholic Church.
The most controversial development occurred 
in April 1958, when the Patriotic leadership, for the 
first time, consecrated bishops without the approval of 
Rome. On April 13, Bishop Li Daonan presided over 
the consecration ceremony of Dong Guangqing and 
Yuan Wenhua. The Xinhua News agency described the 
consecration as “a path breaking move for the Catholic 
Patriotic movement.”74 Since bishops, according to 
Canon law, could not be consecrated without papal 
approval, the move of the CPA was blatantly schismatic. 
Nonetheless, Pope Pius XII spoke ambiguously about 
the consecrations in the Encyclical Ad Apostolorum 
Principis: the consecrations were “valid” because they 
were performed by legitimate bishops, but remained 
“illicit” without the prior consent of the Holy See.75 
On April 26, the Propaganda Fide issued a document 
in the Osservatore Romano threatening Father Dong 
and Father Yuan of excommunication were they to 
proceed with their ordination.76 Nonetheless, the Pope 
refrained from carrying out the excommunication 
because such a move would have amounted to an 
explicit recognition of a schism in the Chinese 
Catholic Church. 
Thus, at the height of the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
of 1957 and the Great Leap Forward of 1958, the CCP 
further heightened its tensions with the Vatican. 
As Pius XII continued uttering his anti-communist 
quips, China brought its national Catholic Church to 
a quasi-schismatic situation by creating the CPA and 
by consecrating its own bishops without the approval 
of Rome. Although pro-Communist associations 
of Catholics similar to the CPA existed in Eastern 
European communist regimes, the Chinese went 
further than the Eastern Europeans by appointing 
their own bishops. During the Great Leap Forward, 
the radical ideology environment was such that 
deliberate confrontation against the Holy See was the 
only logical choice for the Chinese leaders. 
1958-1976: IDEOLOGICAL DEAFNESS OF THE 
CCP
Between 1958 and 1976, the Vatican had 
continuously made appeals for dialogue. However, 
Beijing remained “ideologically deaf.” Since Mao 
viewed China’s grand strategy in terms of world 
revolution and class struggle, the choices of Vatican 
were also understood through those ideological 
lenses. First, the increasingly close interactions 
between Vatican and the Soviet Union reinforced the 
Chinese perception of Vatican as an enemy because 
Beijing’s ideological conflict with the Soviet Union 
escalated during the 1960s. Second, Paul VI’s attempts 
at mediation in the Second Indochina War also gave 
significant ammunition for the propaganda of Chinese 
newspapers, since Mao sought to use the international 
tensions surrounding the Vietnam conflict for the 
purpose of domestic mobilization. The ideological 
commitment of the Chinese leaders to anti-revisionism 
and the Vietnam conflict subsequently locked Beijing 
in a stance of hostility toward the Vatican. Even as 
China reoriented its strategy toward rapprochement 
with the United States in the 1970s, it still remained 
unwilling to improve relations with Vatican. 
While John XXIII made significant strides in 
lowering tensions with the Soviet Union, he vacillated 
on the question of China. The ordinations of Bishop 
Dong and Bishop Yuan without Papal approval posed 
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not only a political problem but also a doctrinal 
difficulty. Pius XII died before taking a clear position 
on the issue. In a 1958 encyclical, John XXIII deplored 
the weakness and fear of illicit bishops for driving 
China toward a schism.77 The Pope also accused the 
CCP for pursuing “a plan to force Our Children to 
obey false pastors.”78 However, in November 1962, 
after consulting with his China experts, the Pope 
promised not to use the word “schism” to describe the 
Church in China. Furthermore, twenty bishops who 
had worked in China signed a declaration stipulating 
that the Chinese Church was not schismatic.79 In 
banning the use of the word “schism” from Vatican’s 
subsequent discussion of China, the Pope avoided a 
de jure severance of spiritual ties with the Chinese 
National Church, hoping to open a window for further 
dialogue with the CCP and reconciliation with the 
Chinese Church.
The CCP, in the midst of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign and the Great Leap Forward, remained 
indifferent to the shift of Vatican’s attitude toward 
Communism. The ideologically charged invectives 
against Vatican persisted in official press throughout 
the whole duration the newly elected liberal Pope’s 
tenure. In 1959, at the Second National People’s 
Congress, Catholic delegates Li Weiguang and Hu 
Wenyao accused the Vatican of “mixing politics 
with religion” for the purpose of serving reactionary 
imperialists.80 The CCP did not neglect to portray the 
Vatican as a reactionary servant of the “imperialist 
United States”: the Xinhua News Agency identified the 
Vatican and the Peace Corps as President Kennedy’s 
“tools of invasion” that were meant to “support his 
projects of armed invasion.”81 Furthermore, the 
Xinhua News Agency never failed to stress that 
the Vatican was “resolutely opposed” to Marxist 
ideology.82 The sustained ideologically charged media 
attacks against the Vatican throughout the tenure of 
John XXIII suggested that the CCP had no intention 
to either de-escalate the PRC’s tensions with the Holy 
See or mitigate its aggressive United Front tactics 
toward the Chinese Catholic Church. 
Paul VI, unlike his predecessors, directly 
appealed to the CCP leaders for dialogue. Shortly after 
his election in 1963, Paul VI sent a message to CCP 
leaders stressing the compatibility of the Catholic 
faith and patriotism toward China.83 In 1967, he 
renewed his direct appeals for peace to China.84 
Paul VI’s overtures were largely built on John XXIII’s 
groundwork of purging the word “schism” from the 
Vatican’s discussions on China. During a speech at 
the United Nations in 1965, he called for universal 
membership at the UN, hinting that the PRC should 
be admitted in the organization.85 In attempting 
rapprochement with the PRC, Paul VI distanced 
himself from Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in Taiwan. 
During a visit to Hong Kong in 1970, when meeting 
a Taiwanese delegation, Paul VI did not make any 
commitment toward anti-Communism that would 
have reassured the Taiwanese; he instead focused on 
general questions of spirituality.86
The 1960s saw the escalation of two major Cold 
War conflicts: the ideological split between China 
and the Soviet Union, and the military confrontation 
that pitted North Vietnamese (Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam, or DRV) Communist forces against the 
armies of South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam, or 
RVN) and the United States. The roots of the Sino-
Soviet ideological split could be traced as far back 
as the CCP’s inner party conflicts between Mao and 
the Comintern-backed Chinese cadres in the 1930s. 
However, recent scholarship identified the following 
crucial turning points that heralded the ideological 
split: Khruschev’s Secret Speech at the Twentieth Party 
Congress in 1956 and his unpleasant exchanges with 
Mao in 1958 regarding the creation of a Sino-Soviet 
joint fleet stationed in the PRC’s coastal area.87 As for 
the Vietnam War, the United States provided limited 
military and financial aid to the South Vietnamese 
regime beginning in the 1950s. However, it was only 
after the Tonkin incident in August 1964 that the 
Johnson administration began escalating an undeclared 
war against Indochinese Communist forces. The PRC, 
on its part, pledged significant military and material 
assistance to the DRV. Strangely enough, the Holy 
See had an uncanny ability to involve itself in the 
PRC’s important ideological conflicts. Consequently, 
Beijing’s perception of Vatican drastically changed as 
its ideological rifts with the Soviet Union deepened. 
Although the Chinese Communists were 
dismayed with Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin, they 
did not immediately proclaim a public break with 
the Soviet Union. Prior to 1958, the Vatican was 
still considered an “anti-Soviet”, imperialist foe.88 
However, as the ideological disagreements between 
China and the Soviet Union came to the fore, the 
CCP gradually began to portray the Vatican as an ally 
of Soviet revisionism.  The gradual Soviet-Vatican 
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rapprochement that resulted from the Holy See’s 
Ostpolitik in the 1960s provided ample ammunition 
for the Party polemicists of the state-controlled media. 
On October 28, 1963, the Renmin Ribao released an 
Albanian editorial that denounced the “Khrushchevite 
clique” for “raising the banner of betrayal and split” 
and for seeking rapprochement with “the enemies of 
socialism and peace,” which included the Vatican.89 
During the Cultural Revolution, the ideological 
fulminations of the official press painted a colorful 
picture of the “Soviet-Vatican connivance.”90 A 
Renmin Ribao article in April 1967 denounced the 
“hypocrisy of Paul VI’s criticisms of colonialism” and 
the “dishonesty of Soviet Revisionists for praising the 
Pope’s so-called anti-capitalist and anti-colonialist 
credentials.”91 On May 8, 1967, the Xinhua News 
Agency released excerpts of an Albanian editorial, 
which argued that “the Vatican, the American 
Imperialists and the Soviet Revisionists advocated for 
‘European détente’ in order to strategically position 
world counterrevolutionary forces against the center 
of world revolution – the People’s Republic of China.”92 
Toward the end of October 1967, official Chinese 
media released a rumor that Soviet Premier Alexei 
Kosygin was nominated as a potential candidate for 
the 1967 Nobel Peace Prize, alongside UN Secretary 
General U Thant and Pope Paul VI.93 This rumor 
was entirely unsubstantiated. Nobel Peace Prize 
candidates were nominated in secret, and no similar 
rumors appeared in Western newspapers. A series 
of editorials in 1969 attacked the “Soviet Revisionist 
Clique” for its sycophancy toward the Vatican, the 
“Soviet Revisionist traitors” were said to “overindulge 
in opiate” by seeking points of convergence between 
socialism and Christianity.”94 
Thus, Beijing’s portrayal of the Vatican was 
highly influenced by its ideological split with the 
Soviet Union. Since Beijing always described the 
Vatican as “a bastion of reaction,” it was logical for the 
PRC to associate the Holy See with the Soviet Union, 
which, in the eyes of the Chinese leaders, gradually 
replaced the United States as the primary reactionary 
force in the world.95 Because of its radicalizing 
ideological assumptions, China became deaf to 
Vatican’s appeals for dialogue and limited its strategic 
options to confrontation against the Holy See. The 
CCP’s ideological perception of Vatican would fuel its 
inflammatory propaganda rhetoric against the Holy 
See. Because Paul VI was unaware of the domestic 
political development in the PRC, he unwittingly 
entangled himself in the Sino-Soviet split through his 
Ostpolitik.
The PRC’s involvement in the Second Indochina 
War also strengthened the CCP’s perception of the 
Vatican as an ideological enemy, thus contributing to 
the deafness to its dialogue appeals. Recent scholarship 
by Chen Jian and Zhai Qiang have shown that the 
Vietnam conflict became a core ideological component 
of Mao’s revolutionary vision.96 Mao sought to exploit 
the conflict in order to increase international tensions 
and fuel his domestic revolutionary designs, especially 
within the context of the Cultural Revolution. My 
own research on PRC-Holy See relations and on CCP-
Chinese Catholic Church interactions has allowed 
me to unearth evidence supporting the conclusions 
of Chen Jian and Zhai Qiang. The Chinese leaders 
attacked Pope Paul VI’s involvement in the Vietnam 
conflict to escalate the tensions between China 
and Vatican, and subsequently prompt domestic 
ideological mobilization. 
Paul VI’s appeals for a negotiated peace in 
Vietnam, as well as his attempts at mediation between 
the U.S., the RVN and the DRV became subjects of 
CCP ideological diatribes as the PRC stepped up its 
military and financial supports of North Vietnam 
after 1965. The Renmin Ribao editorials attacked the 
Holy See for  “aiding the peace swindle of the U.S. 
Imperialists.”97 In light of the continuous increase of 
the number of American combat forces in Indochina, 
the Xinhua News Agency concluded that Paul VI 
was an accomplice of the U.S. “peace scheme, which 
in fact masked actual American escalation of the 
war.”98 Since Mao needed to increase the international 
tensions arising from the Vietnam conflict to pursue 
his domestic revolutionary goals, he decided to 
dismiss Vatican’s peace appeals as artifices intended to 
masquerade the American escalation of the war. 
The Vietnam War further reinforced Paul VI’s 
unwitting entanglement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. 
Having deposed Khrushchev the year before, the 
new Soviet leadership committed substantial military 
and material assistance to the DRV in 1965, thus 
reversing the earlier Soviet policy of non-interference 
in Indochina. Yet, unlike the PRC, the Soviet Union 
wanted the DRV to end the conflict through a 
negotiated settlement. Vietnam now became an arena 
of competition between Beijing and Moscow for 
leadership of world revolution. Beijing, in the official 
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press, insisted that Moscow and Washington were 
“aligned” in their views on Vietnam, and that they 
conspired together with the Vatican to put forward 
a “peace swindle.”99 The Chinese saw the Pope’s 
meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 
April 27, 1966, and with U.S. Ambassador to RVN 
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. on May 3, 1966 as signs that 
the Pope was “weaving threads between American 
Imperialists and Soviet Revisionists on the Vietnam 
Question.”100 The purpose of the Pope’s meeting with 
Gromyko was to confer about pastoral questions 
within the Soviet Union, and there is no conclusive 
evidence indicating that the Pope discussed Vietnam 
at length with Gromyko as he had with Lodge a few 
days later.101 Nonetheless, the Chinese still judged 
necessary to view the successive meetings of the Pope 
with Gromyko and Lodge as a sure sign of Soviet-
American-Vatican conspiracy. Given the radicalizing 
ideological framework of the Cultural Revolution, this 
was, for the Chinese, the most plausible conclusion 
to be drawn. The CCP deemed necessary to zealously 
“expose” the Vatican-Soviet-American “peace 
swindle” to both publicly demonstrate their solidarity 
with the Vietnamese people and affirm their own 
central position in the world movement of communist 
revolution.102 
In a similar vein, Beijing viewed the meeting 
between the Pope and the Soviet President Nikolai 
Podgorny as another instance of Soviet Revisionists 
“forming a joint-venture company,” with the Vatican 
and the American imperialists bringing forward the 
“peace swindle.”103 Podgorny’s meeting with the Pope 
in January 1967 spurred a wave of angry Renmin Ribao 
editorials that did not subside until March 1968.104 The 
Xinhua News Agency even threw in a few anti-Soviet-
revisionism tirades of the loyal Albanian comrades.105 
However, the Chinese aid to the DRV began to wane 
from 1968 onwards, as China reoriented its foreign 
policy toward rapprochement with the United States. 
Domestically, Chinese society was on the verge of 
collapse as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Within 
this context, the anti-Vatican accusations related to 
the Vietnam situation began to disappear from the 
official press.
The Vietnam conflict also permeated the 
relations between the CCP and the Chinese Catholic 
Church toward the mid-1960s. In the only 1965 issue 
of the Courier Pigeon (信鸽), the official journal of 
the Patriotic Church, out of total number of eleven 
articles, five were public declarations of solidarity to 
the struggle DRV from various Party and government 
organs.106 None of the eleven articles discussed 
pastoral matters. In 1965, the United Front Work 
Department, the agency responsible for the Party’s 
relations with non-Party elements, including the 
Catholic Church, operated within an increasingly 
radicalized ideological environment. Beijing’s 
Vietnam policies thus became ideologically relevant 
to the CCP’s United Front tactics toward the Chinese 
Catholic Church. That the Vietnam question figured 
prominently within the CCP-Chinese Catholic 
Church relations supports Chen Jian’s conclusion 
that the tension related to the Vietnam conflict 
promoted Mao’s domestic revolutionary goals. In the 
late 1960s, Mao did not wish for a peace in Vietnam, 
since he needed the conflict to promote his domestic 
campaigns of ideological mobilization. It is thus not 
surprising that Mao’s Vietnam propaganda figured 
prominently in the CCP’s dealings with the Catholic 
Church. 
In 1969, China was caught in a precarious 
situation. Abroad, Mao’s commitment to world 
revolution placed China in opposition against both 
the United States and the Soviet Union, in addition to 
alienating third world powers that were sympathetic 
to Beijing in the 1950s. At home, both the CCP and 
the Chinese society were in shambles. The United 
Front had collapsed under the weight of ideological 
radicalization, and the Red Guard youths that Mao 
unleashed upon the Party became intractable. The 
ideological conflict with the Soviet Union still raged 
on, and it could escalate into a full-blown war anytime. 
With this situation in mind, Mao and the Chinese 
leaders began reorienting China’s grand strategy 
by steering toward rapprochement with the United 
States. The strategic reorientation of Beijing toward 
Washington appeared to have reduced the tensions 
between China and Vatican, since the Chinese 
leaders sent signals that Vatican immediately took for 
indications of a willingness to engage dialogue. 
Toward the end of 1969, the usual ideological 
invectives in Chinese media against Vatican faded 
into an ominous silence. Then, at the beginning of 
July 1970, the Chinese Communists suddenly decided 
to release Bishop James Edward Walsh, an American 
Maryknoll missionary imprisoned since 1954 for 
alleged charges of espionage. Paul VI received the 
news of Walsh’s release with much enthusiasm. The 
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Pope made explicit his expectations of “better days to 
come in Continental China” during a public address 
at the St. Peter’s Square on July 12, 1970.107 Bishop 
Walsh, after a brief period of health recovery in Hong 
Kong, went to the Vatican to visit the Pope on August 
25.108 Paul VI probably interpreted Walsh’s release as a 
signal that the Chinese want to improve relations with 
the Vatican. This was probably why, in October 1971, 
Paul VI decided to leave vacant the post of apostolic 
nuncio to the Republic of China (ROC)/Taiwan after 
recalling Archbishop Cassidy, the last nuncio to the 
ROC.109 Many others shared Paul VI’s optimism. 
Reportedly, the Father Louis Wei Tsing-sing, a 
Chinese priest living in Paris, came to Rome on his 
own accord in 1971 to talk to Secretary of State Jean 
Villot about the possibility of normalization with the 
PRC.110 However, China rebuked Vatican’s gestures of 
good will: Father Wang Ki-ting, a priest from Beijing, 
told the Italian press that the Chinese Catholic Church 
was autonomous from Vatican and only in “spiritual 
communion with the Pope.”111 
A second sign, which also seemed to announce 
a softening of the PRC’s attitude toward the Chinese 
Catholic Church, occurred in 1971. Churches were 
reopened in Beijing for the first time since the beginning 
of the Cultural Revolution. In November 1971, a 
mass was celebrated for foreigners in a church.112 In 
1972, two churches began holding regular services 
in Beijing once more.113 Once again, these positive 
developments boosted the Vatican’s optimism. Paul 
renewed his appeals for dialogue in April 1973, 
averring that the thoughts of Mao “reflected Christian 
values.”114 Nonetheless, Vatican hopes proved to be 
unwarranted. The opening of churches in Beijing was 
not followed by a general change of religious policy. 
Because of the PRC’s unchanging intransigence toward 
religions, the Vatican could not hope to re-establish 
its severed ties with the Chinese Catholic Church. 
Furthermore, the “Criticize Confucius Criticize Lin 
Campaign,” which Mao launched in the aftermath 
of Lin Biao’s fall from grace, brought a new wave of 
ideological criticism against all religions. Under such 
circumstances, the Vatican could not earn limited 
freedom for the Chinese Catholic Church, as it had 
done for the Eastern European National Churches 
through its Ostpolitik.
The release of Bishop Walsh and the opening of 
churches in Beijing did not signal China’s intention to 
pursue dialogue with the Vatican. Rather, they were 
indicative of Beijing’s overall strategic shift toward 
rapprochement with the United States. Since Bishop 
Walsh was an American citizen, the Chinese leaders 
sought to use his release to signal their intention 
to improve relations. The churches in Beijing were 
only opened for the purpose of performing religious 
services for the foreign diplomats. This was also aimed 
at paving the way for an eventual rapprochement with 
the United States. Paul VI, eager to establish dialogue 
with the Chinese leaders, and having no knowledge 
of the strategic considerations of the Chinese leaders, 
misinterpreted the Chinese signals. His subsequent 
calls for improved relations only elicited cold reactions 
from the Chinese. Thus, though the reorientation of 
the Chinese foreign policy toward the United States 
led to an apparent thaw in Sino-Vatican relations, the 
domestic ideological environment constrained the 
Chinese into a position of mitigated hostility toward 
the Vatican.
1976-1981:  TRANSITIONAL TIMES
The sudden developments of 1976 completely 
took China by surprise. The death of the PRC’s two 
senior leaders, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, the 
devastating earthquake in Tangshan, and the dramatic 
downfall of the Gang of Four signaled a new period 
of political turmoil that would not end until 1981. 
After coming to power in 1978 and outmaneuvering 
his political rivals, Deng Xiaoping began to set China 
on the path of his Four Modernizations, which slowly 
displaced revolution and class struggle as the Party’s 
ideological focus. Nonetheless, the political turmoil 
would not calm down until the end of the trial of 
the Gang of Four in 1981, as the CCP grappled with 
the problem of the posthumous assessment of Mao. 
As China transitioned toward a post Cold-War era, 
Beijing’s grand strategy was no longer constrained 
to strict orientations of unmitigated hostility toward 
either the United States or the Soviet Union as was 
the case before Mao’s death. Beijing now freely shifted 
between conciliatory and hostile courses of action 
in order to accomplish its twin aims of promoting 
the Four Modernizations and of safeguarding its 
sovereignty over domestic religious activities. 
Despite the waning of the Maoist ideological 
discourse, the improvement of the PRC-Holy See 
relations still appeared remote toward the end of the 
1970s. In August 1979, during a press conference, a 
Vatican spokesperson said that the July 25 election of 
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the new Bishop of Beijing, Michael Fu Tieshan, was 
illegitimate because the Pope John Paul II had not 
approved of it.115 However, mitigating his stance, 
the spokesperson added that the Holy See expressed 
“love toward our brothers in faith, particularly those 
who live in the Chinese continent.”116 Later in 1979, 
on October 7, Premier Hua Guofeng told a group 
of European journalists that he would not visit the 
Pope during his impending visit to Italy, since the 
Vatican and Taiwan maintained normal diplomatic 
relations.117 Hua did not pay visit to the John Paul 
II, even when the latter made known his eagerness to 
meet the former.118 Even with John Paul II’s repeated 
overtures and with the new ideological climate in 
China, the question of the appointment of bishops 
remained serious areas of dispute between Beijing and 
Vatican, or more precisely, between the CCP and the 
Holy See. 
Hopes for the improvement in Sino-Vatican 
relations appeared more tangible when the PRC 
received the visit from two high-ranking prelates of the 
Universal Catholic Church at the beginning of 1980. 
On February 27, 1980, the Archbishop of Marseilles, 
Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, landed in Beijing for a 
two-week visit. He was the first high-ranking prelate 
to visit China since the expulsion of Archbishop Riberi 
in 1951.119 The Archbishop of Marseilles met with 
both religious leaders and high-ranked Party cadres 
for informal talks. In a conference with prominent 
leaders from many religious groups, Cardinal 
Etchegaray was asked to discuss the theological 
innovations linked to the Second Vatican Council: his 
audience expressed puzzlement regarding “the lack of 
regard of European Catholics for religious rites.”120 
On March 1, Etchegaray met with Ulanfu, then vice-
president of the People’s Consultative Conference and 
Director of the United Front Work Department.121 
Ulanfu remarked that, although there were diplomatic 
questions that divided Beijing and Vatican, a solution 
to those problems could be achieved through efforts 
from both parties.122 
On the same day, Etchegaray met with Xiao 
Xianfa, the head of the Bureau of Religious Affairs. 
Xiao was considerably more blunt than Ulanfu, 
asserting that “Beijing would look over past mistakes 
of Rome.”123 On more than one occasion, Cardinal 
Etchegaray inadvertently broached the unpleasant 
topic of the underground Catholic Church in China. 
Nonetheless, his Chinese hosts remained courteous 
throughout his stay in China. Etchegaray’s account 
of his encounter with Chinese leaders was sketchy 
at best. He devoted far greater attention to touristic 
details of his trip in his memoirs.
Concomitant to Cardinal Etchegaray’s visit, 
the Chinese separately received another important 
prelate, Cardinal Franz König, Archbishop of Vienna. 
Like Etchegaray, König was invited privately via the 
intermediary of a Chinese Ambassador. König landed 
in Beijing on March 8, and met with Ulanfu and 
Xiao Xianfa just as Etchegaray did. In his article My 
Journey to China, he provides an especially detailed 
account of his encounters with Xiao. Although Xiao 
assured König that, ever since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, the government had secured the freedom 
of religious belief, he insisted that the Catholic Patriotic 
Church strove for total independence and that union 
with Rome would be declined. In a tone reminiscent 
of Emperor Qianlong’s condescending treatment of 
the British delegate George Macartney in 1792, Xiao 
dismissed König’s suggestion of establishing unofficial 
contacts with the Vatican, seeing no need for such 
contacts.iv However, when König pointed out the de 
facto schismatic status of the Patriotic Church, Xiao 
gave a conciliatory response by assuring the prelate 
that China did not wish for schism, and that the 
Chinese Church would respect the religious tradition 
of the Universal Church. Xiao wanted to demonstrate 
that, with China’s new religious policies, the National 
Catholic Church could be rebuilt with or without the 
contribution of Vatican. Nevertheless, China would 
gracefully grant the Vatican the favor of refraining 
from pushing for schism between the Chinese 
National Church and the Universal Church.124
Furthermore, König noticed that no one 
discussed with him the question of Taiwan, which 
tempered his hope for further progress in Sino-
Vatican relations.125 König seemed to have reached 
the conclusion that the Chinese were not ready to 
discuss the issue of establishing diplomatic relations. 
It is doubtful whether the Chinese viewed the Holy 
See as a potential partner of equal diplomatic relations 
in 1981 or if the Chinese ever held such views at all. 
After all, relations between China and Vatican could 
not be founded on a basis of equality, since the CCP 
iv In 1792, George Macartney, led a British Mission to Emperor Qianlong’s 
court with the purpose of establishing full diplomatic relations with the Qing 
empire and negotiating the opening of trade of Chinese ports for British 
Merchants. Qianlong refused all the requests of the British: the Emperor 
contended that the Qing Empire had everything, therefore had no need for 
whatever merchandise the British had to offer.
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could tolerate with difficulty competing sovereignties 
over domestic non-Party elements. 
Finally, in his account of his encounters with CCP 
cadres, König left out his discussions with Ulanfu. 
Likely, he believed Ulanfu to be not as important 
as Xiao Xianfa in the implementation of religious 
policies.126 König was mistaken. Although the 
Bureau of Religious Affairs dealt with the day-to-day 
implementation of religious policies, it always worked 
together with the United Front Work Department 
and never operated independently. As a result, Xiao, 
as head of the Bureau of Religious affairs, probably 
deferred to Ulanfu, the head of the United Front Work 
Department, when making important decisions. 
The visits of Etchegaray and König have shown 
that, although China was willing to pursue contacts 
with the Vatican, relations between the two would 
occur on an unequal basis, with China expecting the 
Vatican to be the party making more concessions. 
China clearly did not see normalization of relations 
with the Vatican as a vital goal. Rather, the PRC, 
guarding jealously its sovereignty over the Chinese 
Catholic Church, was reluctant to engage the Holy See. 
The CCP would only accept an arrangement in which 
the Vatican renounced fully or partially to its claim 
over the right to appoint bishops and other prelates. 
For Beijing, bishops who were consecrated without 
its approval bore the stigma of foreign imperialist 
intrusion.
Shortly after the visits of Cardinals Etchegaray 
and König, on June 9 1980, the PRC authorities 
released Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming, the Apostolic 
Administrator of Guangdong who was jailed in 1958. 
Four months later, in October, the leadership of the 
Catholic Patriotic Association voted to appoint him 
as vice-chairman of the Guangzhou chapter of CPA 
and to restore Deng Yiming to the Bishopric of 
Guangzhou, of which he was deprived when he was 
arrested. Deng Yiming was also allowed to go to Hong 
Kong for medical treatment on November 5. 127 
PRC-Holy See relations appeared to improve 
slowly but surely in the eyes of the Vatican. During 
his trip to Manila in February 1981, Pope John Paul 
II made conciliatory remarks toward China, asserting 
that a good Catholic would “fully contribute to 
building China.”128 John Paul II’s speech was received 
coolly in China. The “Patriotic” Bishop of Beijing, 
Michael Fu Tieshan, said he saw no prospects of 
reconciliation between the Vatican and the Chinese 
Catholic Church.129 Undeterred, John Paul II, ordered 
his Secretary of State Cardinal Agostino Casaroli 
to meet Deng Yiming in Hong Kong as his own trip 
to Asia came to a close.130 When Casaroli arrived 
in Hong Kong on February 28, he held a joint press 
conference with Deng Yiming, in which he stated that 
there were many ways to solve the Taiwan question, 
and that the CPA, despite being illegal, could become a 
legal organization; for that purpose, Bishop Deng had 
to act as a “bridge” between Rome and the Chinese 
Church.131 Before leaving Hong Kong, Casaroli told 
Deng that the Pope wanted to see him.132 Two months 
after Casaroli’s departure, Bishop Deng travelled 
to Rome and met the Pope on April 30.133 Deng 
stayed in Rome for over a month; he learned that the 
Pope appointed him Archbishop of Guangdong on 
June 4, 1980. The appointment was announced on 
Vatican Radio on June 5, and the Pope performed the 
ceremony on June 6.134 
The Chinese angrily protested against Deng’s 
appointment. On June 11, Bishop Yang Gaojian, the 
chairman of the CPA, issued a statement “staunchly 
opposing the Roman Curia’s decision to appoint 
Deng Yiming as Archbishop of Guangzhou.”135 Four 
days later, on June 15, the Bureau of Religious Affairs 
released a public statement endorsing Yang Gaojian’s 
opposition to the appointment.136 On June 24, the 
local Guangzhou chapter of the CPA removed his 
functions of vice-chairman of the Guangzhou CPA 
and of Bishop of the Guangzhou diocese.137 The CPA 
organized more accusation meetings against both 
Deng and the Vatican for the rest of 1981.138 
The sudden setback in the Deng Yiming affair in 
1981 has puzzled scholars of Sino-Vatican relations. 
The Chinese vitriolic reaction was not unexpected; 
however, it is difficult to assess the motives behind 
Vatican’s decision of appointing Deng as Archbishop 
of Guangzhou. Many scholars who study the Chinese 
Catholic Church agree that the appointment was 
Vatican’s blunder. Beatrice Leung wrote that the 
Vatican diplomats misread prior Chinese conciliatory 
gestures as signs of real rapprochement, while Kim-
Kwong Chan contends that the Vatican mistakenly 
believed they had obtained Chinese consent of 
Deng’s appointment.139 However, the “Vatican 
misunderstanding” explanation probably rests on the 
flimsy assumption that Pope John Paul II, in 1981, saw 
Chinese consent as an important precondition to Deng’s 
appointment. Unlike his predecessors Paul VI and John 
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XXIII, John Paul II was not shy about confrontation; 
his policies of propping up a resistance Church in 
Poland more than convincingly demonstrated his 
occasionally confrontational verve. Furthermore, by 
1980 the Vatican had accumulated a considerably 
rich experience in dealing with Communist states 
through its Ostpolitik. The nomination of new Bishops 
in Eastern European States often required a complex 
negotiation process. In light of this experience, it 
would be simply ridiculous for a conciliatory Holy See 
to nominate a new Chinese Archbishop on the basis 
of unconfirmed Chinese acquiescence. The argument 
that John Paul II’s move was confrontational would 
be more plausible. The Pope probably wanted to test 
Beijing’s intentions toward Vatican. Thus, through the 
nomination of Deng as Archbishop, John Paul II broke 
with his earlier conciliatory approach toward China.
Bishop Deng certainly expected immediate 
improvements of relations between Beijing and the 
Vatican: he expected to successfully fulfill his role 
as a “bridge” between the Holy See and the Patriotic 
Church. Many indications from the behavior of the 
Chinese led him to entertain such illusions. Prior to his 
departure for Hong Kong, a CCP cadre asked Bishop 
Deng whether he was going to visit the Pope Upon 
finding out Deng’s resolve to go to Rome if the Pope 
asked him to do so, the cadre expressed no further 
opposition.140 When Bishop Deng asked whether he 
could establish relations with the Vatican, the cadre 
did not express explicit disapproval, saying that “it 
is up to our higher leaders to decide this, we cannot 
answer this question.”141 However, further evidence 
indicates that the Chinese probably did not wish for 
immediate substantive improvement in the relations 
with the Vatican in the years between 1980 and 1981. 
The Chinese media stressed the unofficial character of 
Cardinal Roger Etchegaray’s trip, labeling it as “a visit 
from a friend of France.” There was no mention of his 
ties with the Vatican.142 Meanwhile, König’s visit was 
not cited in the press at all, likely because the Chinese 
wished to avoid the kind of media storm that would 
falsely convey the impression that China sought closer 
relations with Vatican. Furthermore, two months after 
the visits by Etchegaray and König, Xiao Xianfa, in 
a speech at the Third Catholic Patriotic Association 
(CPA) Conference of Representatives of May 1980, 
dismissed the Vatican’s calls for dialogue as a means 
to reassert their control over the Chinese Church. 
He urged Catholic believers to be wary of Vatican 
activities.143 
Deng, who was still behind bars at the time of 
Xiao’s speech, was unaware of the full extent of China’s 
reticence at improving relations with Vatican. Deng’s 
release and his subsequent promotions were probably 
part of the CCP’s attempt to bolster the legitimacy of 
the CPA, as Deng was a widely respected priest within 
the Catholic community. This was consistent with the 
Chinese general post-1976 tactic of enlisting non-CPA 
priests to rally the Catholic community to the CPA. 
The bold move of the Pope likely took the Chinese by 
surprise. The Chinese did not oppose Deng’s desire 
to travel to Rome. Therefore, they did not expect 
any sudden developments once Deng met the Pope. 
Deng’s appointment as Archbishop was announced on 
the June 5, 1981, yet the CPA only released a public 
statement voicing its opposition on June 11.144 
It is unclear whether the Chinese had 
contingencies for dealing with any unilateral moves 
from the Pope. The delay with which the Chinese issued 
their response suggests that Beijing spent much time 
either coming up with new contingencies or simply 
drafting the response. While there is no evidence 
supporting this hypothesis, it is possible to observe, 
through a close reading, that Yang Gaojian’s statement 
of opposition was very carefully worded. The first half 
of the statement attacks the “Roman Curia’s” lack of 
regard for the “sovereignty of the [Chinese] Catholic 
Church”, while the second half accuses Deng Yiming 
for “harming the self-respect of the Chinese Clergy 
and People” in accepting the appointment at the 
Roman Curia.145 The diatribe against Deng Yiming 
indirectly challenged the “bridge” role the Vatican 
conferred upon the Bishop. Since Vatican presented 
Deng Yiming as a bridge, it was logical for China to 
“burn this bridge.”146 
However, the statement avoided direct attacks on 
the person of the Pope. The Vatican was always referred 
to as “Roman Curia” instead of “Holy See” to emphasize 
the political character of the statement and gloss over 
its implications concerning spiritual questions. The 
Bureau of Religious Affairs, a few days later, endorsed 
the CPA’s statement, directly condemning, with the 
same careful wording, the Vatican’s “interference in 
China’s internal matters.”147 In December 1981, at a 
tea conference for religious leaders organized by the 
United Front Work Department, Zhang Zhi, the vice-
chairman of the UFWD, congratulated the CPA leaders 
for their anti-Vatican stance in the Deng Yiming 
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Affair.148 Beijing, taken off guard by John Paul’s bold 
move, seemed to lose the control over the dynamics 
of Sino-Vatican relations. It also saw Deng Yiming’s 
appointment as a direct challenge to the integrity of 
its United Front with the Chinese Catholic Church. To 
correct this situation, the CCP carefully took the time 
to plan and coordinate responses between the CPA 
and the State and Party bureaucracies in order to raise 
the level of tension in its relations with the Vatican.
Thus, between 1976 and 1981, as China moved 
away from the Cold War conflicts that plagued the 
world, its possibilities toward the Holy See were no 
longer bound to its ideologically-determined grand 
strategy of opposition against either superpower. As a 
result, Beijing pursued contradictory policies toward 
the Vatican. The visits by Cardinals Etchegaray and 
König to China indicated China’s willingness to improve 
relations in the post-Mao era. However, the botched 
appointment of Bishop Deng Yiming demonstrated 
that China was unwilling to compromise on matters 
of sovereignty over religious life within the Chinese 
Church. Moreover, it showed that the shadows of 
foreign encroachment still haunted it. Pope John Paul 
II’s confrontational approach clearly did not work for 
China as it had for Eastern Europe. China alternated 
between hostility and conciliation toward the Vatican 
because it needed to make friends abroad to improve 
its international standing and to carry out its Four 
Modernizations, but it also felt compelled to jealously 
guard its sovereignty. 
1981-1989: STAGNATION OF PRC-VATICAN 
RELATIONS
The end of the trial of the Gang of Four in 
1981 gave way to a new era of political stability in 
which reform and opening displaced revolution 
and class struggle as the watchwords of the day. The 
establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations 
in 1978 heralded a friendlier international environment 
in which China could pursue its Four Modernizations 
with the help of foreign capital. Nevertheless, though 
China had mostly shed its Cold Warrior skin in the 
1980s, Sino-Vatican relations still seemed to stagnate. 
China continued to pursue its contradictory policy 
of conciliation and confrontation, for its twin aims of 
economic modernization and defense of sovereignty 
did not change. China’s post-Cold War diplomacy 
greatly resembled its United Front policy of “alliance 
and struggle.”149 This is no coincidence, as the scope 
of CCP United Front activities expanded to an 
international horizon in the Deng era.
After the death of Mao, the Communist Chinese 
leadership readily acknowledged that religions would 
have a long-term presence in China despite the 
prophesies of Communist ideologues regarding its 
imminent disappearance. In March 1982, the Central 
Committee issued a Party document calling for the 
co-optation of religious groups.150 Furthermore, 
the Constitution explicitly guaranteed religious 
freedom.151 However, the Party made a distinction 
between legitimate religious beliefs and subversive 
ideas, which it deemed as “spiritual pollution.”  It also 
warned against “infiltration” on the part of foreign 
religious organizations.152 
This double standard led to contradictory 
measures regarding the Party’s relationship with the 
Chinese Catholic Church. The Party sought to co-
opt the Catholic community by placing formerly 
incarcerated respected priests, such as Alyosius Jin 
Luxian and Dominic Deng Yiming, in prominent 
positions within the Catholic Patriotic Association.153 
Yet the CCP also briefly incarcerated a few Jesuits 
in 1983 for allegedly subversive activities.154 This, 
however, does not change the fact that in the 1980s, the 
Party considered religion to be a permanent feature 
in China’s social and cultural landscape. Moreover, 
Bishop Gong Pinmei was released in 1986; with 
world revolution no longer the primary ideological 
watchword of the day, the dissident Bishop was no 
longer useful for China’s propaganda campaigns. 
Sino-Vatican relations reached their low point at 
the beginning of 1982. On January 6, Pope John Paul 
II, in an open “Letter to the Bishops of the World,” 
invited bishops to “pray for the Church of China.”155 In 
March 21, the Pope celebrated a mass for the Church 
of China, during which he “renewed his expression 
of his affection and esteem for the people.”156 Prior 
to the celebration of the Mass, on March 19, Bishop 
Yang Gaojian of the CPA released a public statement 
apparently preemptively condemning the Pope for 
“slanderously claiming that the Chinese Catholics 
were suffering.”157 The wording of Yang’s statement 
was certainly curious, for it anticipated precise 
formulations on “the suffering of Chinese Catholics,” 
which were not present in the Pope’s statement at the 
mass on March 21. Yang’s statement was probably 
meant to rebuke the Pope’s January “Letter to the 
Bishop’s of the World,” in which John Paul II made 
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explicit reference to “difficult and prolonged trials 
in the span of these years.”158 Although the Pope 
made this claim in describing the state of affairs 
of the Chinese Church over a span of 30 years, the 
Chinese misconstrued this claim as a description of 
present affairs, which the Chinese then vehemently 
refuted. When discussing present state of affairs, the 
Pope actually praised the new religious freedoms that 
were granted in China. Thus, the Chinese deliberately 
misconstrued the Pope’s statement on the “difficult 
trials” of Chinese Catholics and refuted a claim the 
Pope did not even make. 
At first sight, this maneuver seems absurd. 
However, a closer examination of the Pope’s “Letter 
to Bishops of the World” reveals another problematic 
statement: “How consoling it is to receive the news 
of the constant and courageous loyalty of Catholics 
in China to the faith of their fathers and their filial 
attachment to Peter’s See.”159 Although this passage 
made no mention of the divide between the Patriotic 
and the Underground Churches, it still appeals to 
traditional Confucian values of loyalty and filial 
piety in a forcefully subversive fashion. John Paul II, 
glossing over the schismatic questions that plagued 
the Chinese Church, bluntly averred that all Catholics 
in China remained loyal to the Holy See. It is difficult 
to conclude beyond doubt that the Pope intended 
to engage in subtle polemics, but the CCP certainly 
interpreted the passage as a direct challenge to their 
authority over the Chinese Catholic Church. To affirm 
that Chinese Catholics were loyal to the “Peter’s See” 
out of filial piety was tantamount to challenging the 
integrity of the CCP’s United Front with the Chinese 
Catholic Church. The CPA did not issue a direct 
rebuttal the Pope’s subversive passage; to do so would 
have amounted to schism, which neither the CPA 
nor the CCP wanted. Nonetheless, Yang Gaojian’s 
statement was the first instance, since the Cultural 
Revolution, of CPA churchmen explicitly attacking 
the person of the Pope in the official press. If the CPA 
could not challenge the Pope’s subversive passage, 
then at least it could directly accuse the Pope in order 
to make explicit the widening distance between the 
Chinese Catholic Church and the Holy See.160
Undaunted by the setback in PRC-Holy See 
relations, the Vatican continued exploring new ways to 
improve its relations with the PRC. In 1982, Casaroli 
toyed with the idea of a “Chinese Rite,” which is the 
creation of a new rite in China that would allow the 
Chinese Catholic Church to remain in communion 
with the Universal Catholic Church while retaining 
a relative administrative autonomy.161 A “Chinese 
Rite” church would have been modeled on the Uniate 
Catholic Churches in Greece and Ukraine. Casaroli’s 
proposition possibly entailed radical theological 
innovations, such as terminating the existing Latin 
Rite liturgies (pre-Vatican II), which was in use by 
the Chinese Catholic Church at that time. Casaroli 
probably believed this was the best solution to the 
schismatic situation in China. The National Catholic 
Church officially committed its schismatic act when, 
in 1958, it ordained its first Bishop without prior 
papal approval. Since then, the Patriotic Church had 
ordained new bishops on its own. Although the Holy 
See had not been in contact with the Chinese Church 
from the late 1950s until the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, the Chinese Church miraculously 
survived. However, the lack of communion with the 
Holy See effectively meant that the Chinese Church 
bore a schismatic character, even if the Vatican 
refrained from declaring that a schism had occurred. 
Casaroli thus hoped that a “Chinese Rite” would allow 
the Holy See to reconcile with an estranged Chinese 
Church without disrupting its current administrative 
autonomy, which would placate the CCP. Nonetheless, 
the “Chinese Rite” proposition had to be abandoned. 
As Beatrice Leung points out, there was no specialist 
in China who would be suited for this task; all experts 
in theology and liturgy belonged to the Latin Rite 
Church.162 
John Paul II, seeing that direct diplomacy, 
whether conciliatory or confrontational, yielded no 
positive results, shifted his policies toward indirect 
reconciliation by encouraging ties between the 
mainland church and the local churches of Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. In February 1984, during a meeting with 
Taiwanese bishops, the Pope invited the Taiwanese 
Catholic Church and all other overseas Chinese 
Catholics to act as a bridge between the Chinese 
Catholic Church and the Universal Church.163 In 
doing so, the Pope hoped that, by encouraging closer 
interactions between the Chinese Church and the 
Hong Kong and Taiwan Churches, he could open the 
path for an improvement of the relations between 
China and the Holy See. John Paul II’s approach 
yielded mixed results. The two visits of Bishop John 
Baptist Wu of Hong Kong in 1984 and 1986, despite 
their lack of substantial progress, still contributed to 
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the gradual defusing of the tensions between China 
and Vatican from 1982.164
Paralleling John Paul II’s policy of indirect 
inter-Church engagement, the CCP, after 1983, also 
encouraged the “patriotic” priests of the CPA to 
cultivate contacts abroad. In March 1984, a delegation 
from the Canadian Catholic Church was invited to 
China for a friendly visit.165 In October 1987, the CPA 
sent a delegation to Austria, where the delegates met 
with Cardinal König in an informal setting.166 The 
CCP encouraged interactions between the Chinese 
Catholic Church and foreign Churches because they 
were consistent with Deng’s general policy of opening 
up the country and modernizing its economy. Such 
interactions could also be beneficial for his Four 
Modernizations. Enlisting the aid of foreign friends 
was also part of the United Front tactics of the CCP. 
Though the Chinese leaders allowed informal 
contacts of the Chinese Catholic Church to proliferate, 
their resistance to the idea of normalization of relations 
with the Vatican remained strong. In 1984, United 
Front Work Department Director Yang Jingren warned 
against the subversive activities of the Vatican.167 The 
Foreign Ministry reiterated in 1987 and 1988 that, in 
order to have normal relations with China, the Vatican 
must break off relations with Taiwan and refrain from 
interfering with China’s internal affairs, including the 
appointment of bishops.168 Nonetheless, relations 
between China and the Vatican were significantly 
less tense than they were in 1982. The meetings of the 
Cardinal of Manila, Jaime Sin, with former diplomat 
Huang Hua in 1984 and Premier Zhao Ziyang in 
1987, indicated a friendlier relationship between the 
China and the Holy See despite their largely symbolic 
nature.169
Between 1981 and 1989, China’s Vatican 
diplomacy stabilized into a contradictory pattern of 
conciliation and confrontation. Through its vitriolic 
reaction toward the controversial sections of John 
Paul II’s “Letter to the bishops of the world,” Beijing 
sought to assert its sovereignty over religious life in 
China, especially over the appointment of bishops. 
However, in encouraging the friendly visits at the 
level of national churches, China sought to make 
friends abroad to improve its international image and 
to indirectly attract foreign investment and talents to 
China for the Four Modernizations.
CONCLUSION
Between 1949 and 1989, China deliberately 
impeded any prospects of normalization of Sino-
Vatican relations by increasing tensions with the Holy 
See. The PRC’s Cold War entanglements under Mao 
Zedong restricted China to an unambiguous stance of 
hostility toward the Vatican. Only with the death of 
Mao and the China’s gradual exit from the Cold War 
under Deng Xiaoping did courses of action other than 
uncompromising opposition toward the Holy See 
become available to China. 
The outbreak of the Korean War spurred 
ideological domestic mobilization for the campaign 
of Resist America Aid Korea. Given the ideological 
considerations of the Chinese leaders, escalating 
tensions with the Vatican through an anti-imperialist 
struggle was China’s only logical option. The Hungarian 
Crisis of 1956, the Anti-Rightist Campaigns of 1957, 
and the Great Leap forward of 1958-1961, plunged 
the Sino-Vatican relations to a low point by bringing 
forth a new wave of ideological radicalization. Though 
Popes John XXIII and Paul VI attempted to establish 
dialogue with China, the CCP remained ideologically 
deaf to their appeals. Since John XXIII and Paul VI 
initiated an overall conciliatory policy toward all 
communist powers at the time when China was 
engaged in an ideological spat with the Soviet Union, 
they inevitably became the enemies in the eyes of 
the Chinese leaders. Paul VI’s attempts at mediating 
peace between the United States and the DRV only 
confirmed the Chinese leaders’ perceptions that the 
Vatican was working with American imperialists and 
Soviet revisionists, especially at a time when Mao 
sought to exploit the Vietnam conflict for the purpose 
of domestic mobilization. The PRC’s general shift 
toward rapprochement with the United States yielded 
positive development in Sino-Vatican relations. 
However, the ideologically radical environment of the 
Cultural Revolution kept contributing to the Chinese 
leaders’ deafness to Vatican’s pleas until Mao’s death. 
As China transitioned into the post-Cold War 
era between 1976 and 1981, minor dialogues with the 
Vatican became possible. Yet, the relaxed ideological 
environment of the post-Cold War era by no means 
indicated the inevitability of improved relations 
between China and the Holy See. China still escalated 
tensions on purpose if relations with Vatican grew 
too close. The Chinese leaders were still reluctant to 
discuss the issue of appointment of bishops, and they 
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would not compromise their position that no foreign 
powers should interfere in the domestic religious 
affairs of China.  Rapprochement with Vatican could 
only be pursued on China’s terms. Thus, China’s post-
Cold War environment of 1989 still presented more 
possibilities in its dealings with the Vatican, yet its 
commitment to its sovereignty over domestic religious 
matters presented other limitations to its strategy 
toward the Vatican.
In 1991, it was revealed that Pope John Paul II 
had secretly elevated Bishop Ignatius Gong Pinmei to 
the rank of cardinal in 1979. The Chinese leaders were 
furious. The incidents surrounding the Falun Gong in 
the 1990s further hardened the CCP’s attitude toward 
organized religions. Nonetheless, contacts between 
the PRC and the Holy See were maintained; United 
Front representatives engage in either formal or 
informal talks with Vatican diplomats. In December 
2014, Pope Francis I made the shocking choice to not 
receive the Dalai Lama when the latter was in Rome 
for a Nobel laureate conference. The Chinese Foreign 
Ministry praised Francis I’s conciliatory gesture, while 
reiterating China’s interest in further dialogues. This 
sudden development appears to herald a possible 
breakthrough in Sino-Vatican relations. However, the 
problems and legacies of the Cold War confrontations 
between China and the Vatican have not disappeared, 
and they can be only overcome through sustained 
efforts of negotiation from both parties.
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